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I. Introduction 
Assessing the “state” of election law is a precarious venture.1 
Election law has been in a state of flux for more than a half century 
as the Voting Rights Act and Supreme Court decisions have been 
employed in an apparently never-ending tumult of litigation that 
is driven as much by partisan interests as it is to secure a 
particular vision of what constitutes a free and fair electoral 
system.2 In part, the ongoing litigation is a result of courts gaining 
                                                                                                     
 ∗ Mark Rush is Stanley D. and Nikki Waxberg Professor of Politics and 
Law and Director of the Center for International Education at Washington and 
Lee University. 
 1. See Joshua A. Douglas, Is The Right To Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 146 (2008) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court’s current ad 
hoc jurisprudence for election law cases creates confusion regarding what it 
means to enjoy the fundamental right to vote.”). 
 2. See Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the 
New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 178 (2007) (“As with other legislation, 
disagreements about the [Voting Rights Act]’s meaning were passed on to the 
courts, and various legislators attempted to manipulate legislative history for 
384 23 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 383 (2017) 
new and better information about the electoral process as litigants 
return to re-argue cases or present new cases with nuanced 
differences from prior ones.3 As well, the process of litigation has 
demonstrated that notions of democracy are undergoing change.4 
Accordingly, the assumptions on which early decisions were based 
are challenged as new decisions bring new information. 
A good example of this is, perhaps, the shift over time from the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Gomillion v. Lightfoot5 to the one-
person, one vote decisions in Baker v. Carr6 and Reynolds v. Sims7 
to the cases concerning the creation of majority-minority districts 
under the auspices of section two of the VRA and constrained by 
the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
(Thornburg v. Gingles,8 Shaw v. Reno,9 Miller v. Johnson,10 Easley 
                                                                                                     
partisan ends.”). 
 3. See Samuel Issacharoff, Does Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act Still 
Work?, in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 107, 112 (David L. Epstein et 
al. eds., 2006) (“The striking feature about [Georgia v.] Ashcroft was the 
willingness of the entire Court to abandon the formal Beer standard for 
retrogression in favor of a more nuanced assessment of the on-the-ground 
political realities of a jurisdiction.”). 
 4. See John Powell, Campaign Finance Reform Is a Voting Rights Issue: 
The Campaign Finance System as the Latest Incarnation of the Politics of 
Exclusion, 5 AFR. -AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 1, 8 (2002) (hypothesizing that the practical 
response to vote dilution claims may place this country’s most basic notions of 
democracy at stake.”). 
 5. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960) (holding when state 
power is used as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right, it 
is not insulated from federal judicial review).  
 6. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237, 242 (1962) (reversing the dismissal 
of plaintiff’s complaint because redistricting issues present a justiciable question 
since one person’s vote cannot weigh more heavily than another’s vote). 
 7. See Reynolds v. Sims, 374 U.S. 533, 586–87 (1963) (affirming the district 
court’s decision to invalidate existing and proposed plans for the apportionment 
of Alabama’s bicameral legislature because the plans violated “one person one 
vote.”).  
 8. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 80 (1986) (finding that, except in 
one district, the redistricting plan violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by 
impairing the opportunity of black voters to participate in the political process 
and to elect representatives of their choice). 
 9. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993) (deciding that appellants 
stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging the North Carolina 
General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face 
that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting 
districts because of their race). 
 10. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920, 924 (1995) (explaining that the 
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v. Cromartie11). I discuss these in greater detail below. But, for the 
purposes of introduction, I note here that this transition entailed 
the Supreme Court’s rejection of the “uncouth” gerrymander that 
was designed to cut black voters out of Tuskegee, AL,12 to ongoing, 
protracted litigation to establish rules for drawing boundaries of 
voting districts for the sole purpose of ensuring minority 
representational opportunity while simultaneously providing 
enough evidence to suggest that race did not “predominate” in the 
process of line-drawing.13 The result has been the creation of 
districts much more “uncouth” than the boundary of Tuskegee was 
in Gomillion.  
A similar example would be the shift from an environment 
animated by a powerful VRA that could be used to prevent or stop 
a plethora of electoral practices designed either explicitly or sub 
rosa to prevent voter participation (literacy tests, poll taxes, etc.) 
to one in which a VRA weakened by the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Shelby v. Holder is unable to prevent the erection of new 
barriers to electoral participation masquerading in the form of 
voter identification laws designed to prevent fraud.14  
                                                                                                     
redistricting was so bizarre on its face that it was unexplainable on grounds other 
than race and therefore it could not be upheld unless it was narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling state interest, but compliance with antidiscrimination laws 
alone was not a compelling state interest). 
 11. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 258 (2001) (determining that the 
district court’s findings were clearly erroneous because appellees failed to show 
that the legislature could have achieved its legitimate political objectives in 
alternative, racially balanced ways). 
 12. See Jeffrey G. Hamilton, Deeper into The Political Thicket: Racial and 
Political Gerrymandering and the Supreme Court, 43 EMORY L.J. 1519, 1525–26 
(1994) (noting that the Supreme Court in Gomillion rejected the argument that a 
law altering the city limits from a square to “an uncouth twenty-eight-sided 
figure” presented a non-justiciable political question). 
 13. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 988 F. Supp. 2d 1285 
(M.D. Ala. 2013) (finding that the district court erred by considering Alabama’s 
goal of obtaining a 1% population deviation among districts as a relevant factor 
to determine whether race was a predominate factor in redrawing the electoral 
districts); Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505 (E.D. 
Va. 2015) (holding voters failed to meet their burden of proof to show that race 
was the predominate factor motivating 11 out of 12 voting districts and the 1 
voting district motivated by race was to comply with federal antidiscrimination 
law). 
 14. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (holding that the 
coverage formula in Section 4(b) of the VRA, which was used to determine the 
states and political subdivisions subject to Section 5 preclearance, was 
386 23 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 383 (2017) 
In this Article, I discuss the current state of election law with 
regard to these two themes of redistricting and access to the polls. 
These issues reflect two of the three “generations” of voting rights 
litigation that Lani Guinier set forth in Tyranny of the Majority, 
written in 1994, and several law review articles from the same 
period.15 The ongoing litigation demonstrates that the issues of fair 
representation and effective participation that Guinier and many 
others grappled with are truly complex and do not lend themselves 
to easy or quick judicial or legislative resolution.16 This is due, in 
large part, to the complexity and diversity of the different strains 
of democratic theory.17 I bring the article to a close with a 
discussion of the current controversy surrounding the Electoral 
College and how it, too, manifests the tensions that haunt 
democratic theory and the course of election law in the United 
States.18 
II. The Current Context: Redistricting 
                                                                                                     
unconstitutional). Compare Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 
209 (2008) (upholding Indiana’s universally applicable voter-identification law 
because the burden of acquiring, possessing, and showing a free photo 
identification is not severe), with N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 
F.3d 204, 241–42 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding the North Carolina law requiring photo 
ID, reducing the days of early voting, and eliminating same-day registration, out-
of-precinct voting, and preregistration were enacted with racially discriminatory 
intent in violation of the Voting Rights Act). 
 15. See generally LANI GUINIER, TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL 
FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994); Lani Guinier, The Triumph of 
Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 85 
MICH. L. REV. 1077 (1991); Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for 
Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413 (1991).  
 16. See, e.g., Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Doing our Politics in Court: 
Gerrymandering, “Fair Representation” and an Exegesis into the Judicial Role, 78 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 545 (2003) (noting that questions of democratic theory, 
including fair representation are both complex and often intractable). 
 17. See Michael J. Pitts, The Voting Rights Act and the Era of Maintenance, 
59 ALA. L. REV. 903, 908 (2008) (stating legislation surrounding the VRA cannot 
account for every democratic theory so there must always be trade-offs).  
 18. See Norman R. Williams, Why the National Popular Vote Compact Is 
Unconstitutional, 2012 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1523, 1579 (2012) (noting critics of the 
electoral college believe it is contrary to the democratic theory because 
aggregating popular votes into electoral votes may produce a President who 
received fewer popular votes than another candidate). 
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As of this writing, the most recent redistricting case to reach 
the Supreme Court came from Virginia and concerns the drafting 
of state legislative district lines.19 The case addresses the 
constitutionality of twelve state legislative districts that were 
drawn to comply with Section 2 of the VRA.20 They were created to 
ensure that they were majority-minority districts and, therefore, 
provided the minority population with an opportunity to elect 
candidates of their choice.21 The plaintiffs appealed the lower court 
ruling that upheld the districting plan in the face of an Equal 
Protection challenge that alleged that the districts comprised 
unconstitutional racial gerrymanders.22 
The key issue in the case was the extent to which it could be 
argued that racial considerations “predominated” in the process of 
drawing the district lines.23 While Section 2 of the VRA essentially 
required that race must be a factor in drawing district lines,24 the 
Court has also ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the 
predominance of race in the construction of those districts.25 As the 
                                                                                                     
 19. See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 553–
54 (E.D. Va. 2015) (deciding that voters failed to meet their burden of proof to 
show that race was the predominate factor motivating 11/12 voting districts and 
the one voting district motivated by race was to comply with federal 
antidiscrimination law). 
 20. See id. at 510 (“This case challenges the constitutionality of twelve 
Virginia House of Delegates districts . . . as racial gerrymanders in violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States.”). 
 21. See id. at 520 (addressing Delegate Jones’ argument that the majority-
minority districts in the proposed legislation had a black voting-age population 
(BVAP) of 55% or higher). 
 22. See id. at 512 (noting the plaintiffs appealed the lower court’s ruling). 
 23. See id. at 510 (determining that Plaintiffs have the burden of proof to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that race was the predominate factor).  
 24. See id. at 515 (citing Section 2 of the VRA); see also 52 U.S.C. § 10301 
(2016) (prohibiting any voting practice that abridges or denies any US citizen the 
right to vote based on race). 
 25. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating no state shall deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction "the equal protection of the laws.”); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 
630, 642 (1993) (deciding that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s case 
for failure to state a claim because “the central purpose of the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to prevent the states from purposefully 
discriminating between individuals on the basis of race.”); Miller v. Johnson, 515 
U.S. 900, 905 (1995) (finding that the redistricting plan violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment because “the redistricting was so bizarre on its face that it was 
unexplainable on grounds other than race.”). 
388 23 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 383 (2017) 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia stated, 
legislatures are forced to navigate between these two constraints: 
Therein lies the rub. To comply with federal statutory command 
(the VRA), the State must consider and account for race in 
drawing legislative districts in order to craft a compliant plan. 
However, to avoid violating the federal constitution, the State 
must not subordinate traditional, neutral principles to racial 
considerations in drawing district boundaries.26 
The debates in the oral argument were strained because 
members of the Court believed they had resolved this issue in their 
most recent redistricting decision.27 Justice Breyer stated in the 
Bethune-Hill oral argument that he had hoped that the Alabama 
Black Legislative Caucus decision “would end these cases in this 
Court.”28 In Bethune-Hill, Virginia had used a 55% minority 
population threshold for the creation of the 12 majority-minority 
districts.29 Bethune-Hill challenged this threshold as the 
equivalent of an admissions quota that the Supreme Court has 
declared unconstitutional in Bakke v. Regents of the University of 
California and Grutter v. Bollinger.30 
Virginia had set forth several criteria for drawing legislative 
districts.31 These included: 
                                                                                                     
 26. Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 517 (E.D. 
Va. 2015).  
 27. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of 
Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505 (E.D. Va. 2015) (No. 15-680) (arguing that the 
Alabama Legislative Black Caucus should have ended the majority-minority line 
of cases). 
 28. See id. (“I mean, look, which I’m sure you’ve read, in--in the Alabama 
Legislative Black Caucus, which I had hoped [sic] would end these cases in this 
Court, which it certainly doesn’t seem to have done--all right?”).  
 29. See Bethune-Hill, 141 F. Supp. 3d at 519 (“[T]he 55% BVAP figure was 
used in structuring the districts and in assessing whether the 
redistricting plan satisfied constitutional standards and the VRA.”). 
 30. See id. at 530–31 (rejecting the comparison to an admissions quota); 
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 271–72 (1978) (striking down a 
higher education admissions program that reserved a specific number of seats for 
minority applicants). 
 31. See Bethune-Hill, 141 F. Supp. 3d at 518 (setting forth several criteria 
for drawing legislative districts). 
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1. Population Equality. Populations in House of Delegates 
districts could deviate by no more than one percent of the 
average population);  
2. Voting Rights Act. Districts had to be drawn in a manner that 
complied with “protections against the unwarranted 
retrogression or dilution of racial or ethnic minority voting 
strength.”; 
3. Contiguity and Compactness; 
4. All districts had to be single member districts; 
5. Communities of Interest. The districts would be drawn based 
on “legislative consideration of the varied factors that can create 
or contribute to communities of interest.” (Such as economic, 
cultural, geographic factors, etc.); 
6. Priority. Maintaining equal district populations, abiding by 
state and federal constitutional requirements and complying 
with the VRA were given priority among the factors noted 
above.32  
Plaintiffs contended that Virginia’s use of the 55% minority 
population standard demonstrated that racial considerations 
predominated over the other traditional, neutral redistricting 
principles.33 Plaintiffs cited the Supreme Court’s earlier decision 
in Alabama Black Legislative Caucus where it rejected Alabama’s 
use of a similar population threshold: 
We have said that the plaintiff’s burden in a racial 
gerrymandering case is “to show, either through circumstantial 
evidence of a district’s shape and demographics or more direct 
evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the 
predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to 
place a significant number of voters within or without a 
particular district.” That Alabama expressly adopted and 
applied a policy of prioritizing mechanical racial targets above 
all other districting criteria (save one-person, one-vote) provides 
evidence that race motivated the drawing of particular lines in 
multiple districts in the State. And neither the use of statewide 
evidence nor the effort to show widespread effect can transform 
a racial gerrymandering claim about a set of individual districts 
                                                                                                     
 32. Id. at 518. 
 33. See id. at 566 (“The Plaintiffs simply point to the threshold’s attainment 
of the 55% BVAP floor, evidence of racial correlation, and a low compactness score 
to prove that race predominated.”). 
390 23 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 383 (2017) 
into a separate, general claim that the legislature racially 
gerrymandered the State “as” an undifferentiated “whole.”34 
Alabama contended that since its population threshold was one of 
several criteria for drawing district lines, race could not be 
regarded as a predominant factor.35  
But, in order to abide by is interpretation of the VRA’s 
nonretrogression standard, the state sought to maintain the level 
of minority populations that had been effected in its 35 majority 
minority districts in the prior round of redistricting.36 To do this, 
the state had to move many minority voters into the majority-
minority districts because many of those districts had lost 
population since the last redistricting.37 The Court ruled, however, 
that maintaining equal district populations 
is not one factor among others to be weighed against the use of 
race to determine whether race “predominates.” Rather it is a 
part of the redistricting background, taken as a given, when 
determining whether race, or other factors predominate in a 
legislator’s determination as to how equal population objectives 
will be met.38 
Having rejected the state’s use of equal population as a 
counterbalance to the use of race, the Court determined that 
Alabama’s focus on maintaining the previous levels of minority 
population in the majority-minority districts comprised a 
predominant use of race in the districting process.39 As well, the 
Court stated that this interpretation of the VRA’s nonretrogression 
standard was erroneous because “section 5 does not require 
maintaining the same population percentages in majority-
minority districts as in the prior plan. Rather, § 5 is satisfied if 
                                                                                                     
 34. Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1267 (2015). 
 35. See id. at 1263 (noting Alabama’s various goals in redistricting). 
 36. See id. (“Alabama believed that, to avoid retrogression under § 5 [of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965], it was required to maintain roughly the same black 
population percentage in existing majority-minority districts.”). 
 37. See id. (explaining that population required Alabama to add individuals 
to the districts in order to meet the State’s no-more-than-1% population-deviation 
objective). 
 38. Id. at 1270. 
 39. See id. at 1267 (“That Alabama expressly adopted and applied a policy of 
prioritizing mechanical racial targets above all other districting criteria (save one-
person, one-vote) provides evidence that race motivated the drawing of particular 
lines in multiple districts in the State.”). 
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minority voters retain the ability to elect their preferred 
candidates.”40 Accordingly, Alabama was obliged to revisit the 
districting process to assess how large a population of black voters 
was necessary to create the opportunity for them to elect their 
preferred candidate.41 It might, for example, have been possible to 
create such an opportunity in a “crossover” or “influence” district 
(in which even a district with a minority-black population could 
create an opportunity for the black voters to elect a candidate of 
their choice with the assistance of white or other voters who shared 
their preferences.42  
The Court acknowledged that the state of election law with 
regard to redistricting remains precarious:  
The standards of § 5 are complex; they often require evaluation 
of controverted claims about voting behavior; the evidence may 
be unclear; and, with respect to any particular district, judges 
may disagree about the proper outcome. The law cannot lay a 
trap for an unwary legislature, condemning its redistricting 
plan as either (1) unconstitutional racial gerrymandering 
should the legislature place a few too many minority voters in a 
district or (2) retrogressive under § 5 should the legislature 
place a few too few.43 
So, while states need not establish the precise level of minority 
population necessary to avoid a retrogression claim, they did need 
to have a “strong basis in evidence” to justify the minority 
population levels they choose.44 In Alabama’s case, the decision to 
maintain previous minority population levels was too blunt an 
instrument.45 
                                                                                                     
 40. Id. at 1273. 
 41. See id. at 1274 (“[The district court and the legislature] should have 
asked: ‘To what extent must we preserve existing minority percentages in order 
to maintain the minority’s present ability to elect the candidate of its choice?’”). 
 42. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 480 (2003) (explaining that it is 
not necessarily retrogressive for a State to replace safe majority-minority districts 
with crossover or influence districts). 
 43. Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1273–74 
(2015). 
 44. See id. at 1274 (“[A] court’s analysis of the narrow tailoring requirement 
insists only that the legislature have a ‘strong basis in evidence’ in support of the 
(race-based) choice that it has made.”). 
 45. See id. at 1261 (“Section 5 does not require a covered jurisdiction to 
maintain a particular numerical minority percentage. It requires the jurisdiction 
to maintain a minority’s ability to elect a preferred candidate of choice.”). 
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The Virginia redistricting plan was effected before the 
Supreme Court ruled in Alabama. In Bethune-Hill, the challenges 
to the state legislative districts were based on essentially the same 
situation that had existed in Alabama.46 The principal difference 
was that Virginia had used a 55% minority population threshold 
for all majority-minority districts (instead of using the prior 
district’s population levels as Alabama had done).47 Nonetheless, 
the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia sustained the 
legislative redistricting plan.48 
The court reasoned that Virginia’s districting plan was 
constitutional because there was sufficient evidence to indicate 
that the 55% threshold did not demonstrate that race had 
predominated in the districting process.49 Virginia’s use of the 
several districting criteria noted above and its additional desire to 
ensure partisan balance in the state legislature demonstrated that 
the 55% threshold was not a “filter” through which all other 
criteria had passed.50  
In the oral argument before the Supreme Court, the Justices 
and attorneys reviewed the definition of “predominance.”51 The 
predominance “standard” was first set forth in Miller v. Johnson 
where the Court stated that, in an equal protection challenge to a 
redistricting plan, 
The plaintiff’s burden is to show, either through circumstantial 
evidence of a district’s shape and demographics or more direct 
evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the 
predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to 
place a significant number of voters within or without a 
particular district. To make this showing, a plaintiff must prove 
that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral 
districting principles including, but not limited to compactness, 
                                                                                                     
 46. See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 517–
19 (E.D. Va. 2015) (explaining the redistricting plan). 
 47. Compare Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 988 F. Supp. 2d 
1285 (M.D. Ala. 2013), with Bethune-Hill, 141 F. Supp. 3d. 
 48. See Bethune-Hill, 141 F. Supp. 3d at 571 (upholding all 12 challenged 
districts). 
 49. See id. (finding that the 55% threshold did not predominate). 
 50. See id. at 528 (rejecting the dissent’s “racial filter” argument). 
 51. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–8, Bethune-Hill, 141 F. Supp. 3d 
505 (discussing the meaning of “predominance.”). 
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contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities 
defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations.52 
In Bethune-Hill, the Supreme Court sustained the lower court’s 
reasoning and upheld the legislature’s conclusion that it was 
necessary to retain a 55% BVAP to ensure that black voters in the 
75th district had “a functional working majority.”53 The Court 
reaffirmed “the basic racial predominance analysis explained in 
Miller and Shaw II and the basic narrow tailoring analysis 
explained in Alabama.”54 Thus, the question endures regarding 
how much thoughtful use of race—as mandated by the VRA—
becomes tantamount to “predominance” within the context of other 
traditional districting principles that a state takes into account 
when drawing lines.55 But, the Court has begun to offer broad 
guidance in Miller, Alabama and Bethune. Accordingly, the Court 
remanded Bethune so that the district court could review the other 
11 districts that were challenged. 
A. Escaping the “Trap”? 
Bethune-Hill manifests the results of the tortuous course that 
the Supreme Court’s redistricting case law has taken. On the one 
hand, states must avoid the “trap” that the case law sets if states 
are unable to navigate between the Scylla of Section 2 of the VRA 
and the Charybdis of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.56 On the other hand, the oral argument in Bethune-
Hill demonstrates an appreciation for the fact that states require 
some leeway in setting population targets in majority-minority 
                                                                                                     
 52. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995). 
 53. See generally Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S.Ct. 788 
(2017).  
 54. Id. at 802. 
 55. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 (outlining predominant standard); see also 
Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 517 (E.D. Va. 
2015) (stating the need to use the predominant standard). 
 56. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1273–74 
(2015) (explaining the “trap” condemning a redistricting plan as either 
(1) unconstitutional racial gerrymandering should the legislature place a few too 
many minority voters in a district or (2) retrogressive under § 5 should the 
legislature place a few too few). 
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districts if they are to avoid besieging the courts with unending 
litigation.57 
The trap that awaits states was created by the development of 
the Court’s case law from the early one-person, one vote decisions 
of the 1960s,58 through the 1980s decisions regarding how to apply 
Section 2 of the VRA to redistricting plans,59 to the equal 
protection challenges to those redistricting plans in the 1990’s,60 to 
the cases in the 2000s where the Court embraced the use of 
influence and crossover districts,61 to its acknowledgment that 
what appears to be a racial gerrymander may, in fact be driven by 
constitutionally permissible partisan concerns.62 This history 
demonstrates that the several democratic values and visions that 
inform voting rights and election law are not always 
complementary.63 
The one-person, one vote standard, for example, appeared to 
establish a clear-cut means for resolving redistricting conflicts 
before the passage of the VRA.64 By establishing this standard, the 
Court created a clear, prophylactic legal standard that would 
simplify the redistricting process and litigation.65 But, even as 
Chief Justice Warren penned his opinion in Reynolds, it was 
                                                                                                     
 57. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Bethune-Hill, 141 F. Supp. 3d at 505. 
 58. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237, 242 (1962) (establishing that one 
person’s vote cannot weigh more heavily than another person’s vote); Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586–87 (1964) (concluding political equality must mean that 
one person equals one vote).  
 59. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 80 (1986) (explaining how to apply 
§ 2 of the VRA to redistricting plans). 
 60. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993) (upholding a redistricting 
claim under the Equal Protection Clause); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 924 
(1995) (finding a viable redistricting claim under the Equal Protection Clause). 
 61. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 493 (2003) (embracing the use of 
influence and crossover districts). 
 62. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 253 (2001) (noting a need for 
racial and partisan balance). 
 63. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. 
L. REV. 283, 294 (2014) (“[T]he Court does not base its theory of election law on 
any substantive value that the democratic process is meant to realize.”). 
 64. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 557–61 (1964) (providing pre-VRA 
method to resolving redistricting disputes). 
 65. See Michelle H. Browdy, Computer Models and Post-
Bandemer Redistricting, 99 YALE L.J. 1379, 1381 (1990) (“Reynolds v. Sims and 
its progeny clarified the ‘one person, one vote’ standard for political 
redistricting . . . .”). 
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evident that the notion of individual voting equality did not 
necessarily ensure fair representational opportunity.66 In 
Reynolds, he wrote: 
Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are 
elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests. As 
long as ours is a representative form of government, and our 
legislatures are those instruments of government elected 
directly by and directly representative of the people, the right 
to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock 
of our political system. It could hardly be gainsaid that a 
constitutional claim had been asserted by an allegation that 
certain otherwise qualified voters had been entirely prohibited 
from voting for members of their state legislature. And, if a 
State should provide that the votes of citizens in one part of the 
State should be given two times, or five times, or 10 times the 
weight of votes of citizens in another part of the State, it could 
hardly be contended that the right to vote of those residing in 
the disfavored areas had not been effectively diluted. It would 
appear extraordinary to suggest that a State could be 
constitutionally permitted to enact a law providing that certain 
of the State’s voters could vote two, five, or 10 times for their 
legislative representatives, while voters living elsewhere could 
vote only once. And it is inconceivable that a state law to the 
effect that, in counting votes for legislators, the votes of citizens 
in one part of the State would be multiplied by two, five, or 10, 
while the votes of persons in another area would be counted only 
at face value, could be constitutionally sustainable. Of course, 
the effect of state legislative districting schemes which give the 
same number of representatives to unequal numbers of 
constituents is identical. 
Overweighting and overvaluation of the votes of those living 
here has the certain effect of dilution and undervaluation of the 
votes of those living there. The resulting discrimination against 
those individual voters living in disfavored areas is easily 
demonstrable mathematically. Their right to vote is simply not 
the same right to vote as that of those living in a favored part of 
the State. Two, five, or 10 of them must vote before the effect of 
their voting is equivalent to that of their favored 
neighbor. Weighting the votes of citizens differently, by any 
method or means, merely because of where they happen to 
reside, hardly seems justifiable. One must be ever aware that 
                                                                                                     
 66. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 567–68 (explaining the notion that individual 
voting equality did not necessarily ensure fair representational opportunity). 
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the Constitution forbids “sophisticated as well as simple-
minded modes of discrimination.”67 
In this passage, Warren made the clear case for individual voting 
equality and requiring voting districts to have equal populations.68 
There was no rational basis (let alone a compelling interest) for 
discriminating among individual voters’ voting power on the basis 
of where they lived.69 Warren went on to discuss the nature of 
representation.70 In doing so, he created an unresolvable tension 
within the opinion71: 
Logically, in a society ostensibly grounded on representative 
government, it would seem reasonable that a majority of the 
people of a State could elect a majority of that State’s 
legislators. To conclude differently, and to sanction minority 
control of state legislative bodies, would appear to deny majority 
rights in a way that far surpasses any possible denial of 
minority rights that might otherwise be thought to result. Since 
legislatures are responsible for enacting laws by which all 
citizens are to be governed, they should be bodies which are 
collectively responsive to the popular will. And the concept of 
equal protection has been traditionally viewed as requiring the 
uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to 
the governmental action questioned or challenged. With respect 
to the allocation of legislative representation, all voters, as 
citizens of a State, stand in the same relation regardless of 
where they live. Any suggested criteria for the differentiation of 
citizens are insufficient to justify any discrimination, as to the 
weight of their votes, unless relevant to the permissible 
purposes of legislative apportionment. Since the achieving of 
fair and effective representation for all citizens is concededly 
the basic aim of legislative apportionment, we conclude that 
the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for 
equal participation by all voters in the election of state 
legislators. Diluting the weight of votes because of place of 
residence impairs basic constitutional rights under 
the Fourteenth Amendment just as much as invidious 
                                                                                                     
 67. Id. at 562–63. 
 68. See id. at 577 (stating that districts should be as nearly of equal 
population as possible). 
 69. See id. at 565 (“With respect to the allocation of legislative 
representation, all voters, as citizens of a State, stand in the same relation 
regardless of where they live.”). 
 70. See id. (discussing the nature of representation).  
 71. Id. 
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discriminations based upon factors such as race, or economic 
status. Our constitutional system amply provides for the 
protection of minorities by means other than giving them 
majority control of state legislatures. And the democratic ideals 
of equality and majority rule, which have served this Nation so 
well in the past, are hardly of any less significance for the 
present and the future.72 
This passage dictates two principles that are not necessarily 
consistent.73 Equality of individual voting power does not ensure 
fair and effective representational opportunity because the latter 
is, by definition, a group right.74 To provide for equal individual 
voting power would require nothing more than randomly dividing 
a state into voting districts of equal population.75 But ensuring fair 
and effective representational opportunity requires someone to 
draw voting districts with an eye towards ensuring that groups of 
voters have the opportunity to coalesce and elect representatives.76 
As the Court explained in Miller, those groups of voters may 
take on any number of characteristics.77 But, the VRA mandated 
that minority groups receive privileged treatment in the 
redistricting process.78 In Thornburg v. Gingles,79 the Court set 
forth the standard for determining whether a group of minority 
voters could demand that a state draw a district that would enable 
it to have the opportunity to elect a candidate of its choice.80 
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan stated: 
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is 
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a 
                                                                                                     
 72. Id. at 565–66. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Garza v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 773–76 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(finding that redistricting based on equal apportionment of total population was 
proper). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 947 (1995) (detailing variations of 
voter groups). 
 78. See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 201, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400, 401 
(1975). 
 79. 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (holding that plaintiffs challenging a redistricting 
plan under § 2 of the VRA could point to racially polarized voting to establish a 
prima facie case of vote dilution without having to prove causation or intent). 
 80. See id. at 50–51 (outlining elements that require redistricting to 
accommodate minority choice).  
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majority in a single-member district. If it is not, as would be the 
case in a substantially integrated district, the multi-member 
form of the district cannot be responsible for minority voters’ 
inability to elect its candidates. 
Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is 
politically cohesive. If the minority group is not politically 
cohesive, it cannot be said that the selection of a multimember 
electoral structure thwarts distinctive minority group interests. 
Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white 
majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—in the absence 
of special circumstances, such as the minority candidate 
running unopposed, usually to defeat the minority’s preferred 
candidate.81 
Gingles dealt with a challenge to multimember districts in the 
North Carolina legislature.82 But, the “test” set forth by Justice 
Brennan established the conditions under which a group of 
minority voters could claim that a districting scheme diluted its 
opportunity to elect candidates of its choice.83 Brennan’s test was 
grounded upon the Court’s reading of Section 2 of the VRA: 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, 
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State 
or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or 
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to 
vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the 
guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2), as provided in subsection 
(b).  
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the 
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes 
leading to nomination or election in the State or political 
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of 
a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its 
members have less opportunity than other members of the 
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of 
a protected class have been elected to office in the State or 
political subdivision is one circumstance which may be 
                                                                                                     
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. at 35 (noting that appellees were challenging one single-member 
and six multimember districts). 
 83. See id. at 50–51 (“These circumstances are necessary preconditions for 
multimember districts to operate to impair minority voters’ ability to elect 
representatives of their choice.”). 
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considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a 
right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers 
equal to their proportion in the population.84 
Accordingly, minority groups were entitled to an opportunity to 
elect candidates of their choice, but they were not guaranteed 
proportional representation.85 But, the confluence of the one-
person, one-vote rule and the Gingles test quickly led to the 
creation of bizarrely-shaped voting districts designed to connect 
enough pockets of minority voters to ensure that they could 
comprise a majority of a district’s population.86 
In Shaw v. Reno, the Court held that this process could be 
taken too far.87 Voters challenged North Carolina’s redistricting 
scheme because the outline of the voting districts indicated that 
they had been drawn exclusively to ensure the election of minority 
candidates.88 Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor stated: 
[R]eapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter. 
A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals 
who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely 
separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who 
may have little in common with one another but the color of 
their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political 
apartheid. It reinforces the perception that members of the 
same racial group-regardless of their age, education, economic 
status, or the community in which they live-think alike, share 
the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates 
at the polls. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as 
impermissible racial stereotypes.89 
Thus, to challenge a districting scheme for being dominated by 
racial considerations, a plaintiff had to demonstrate “that the 
legislation, though race neutral on its face, rationally cannot be 
understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into 
different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation 
lacks sufficient justification.”90 
                                                                                                     
 84. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1331 (5th Cir. 1994) (analyzing 
an odd-shaped district for signs of racial gerrymandering). 
 87. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993). 
 88. Id. at 633–34. 
 89. Id. at 647. 
 90. Id. at 649. 
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Whereas the Gingles standard invited the creation of majority-
minority districts with reckless abandon, the Shaw response relied 
too much on the appearance of a district.91 It overlooked the 
possibility that an aesthetically pleasing map of legislative 
districts could still be driven by racial considerations.92 
Accordingly, in Miller, the Court qualified the Shaw standard to 
require a demonstration that racial considerations had 
predominated the process of drawing district lines.93 
The predominance “trap” described by the Court in Alabama 
remains.94 In attempting to clarify how much racial consideration 
comprises “predominance,” the Court and litigants continue to 
struggle with the fact that Section 2 of the VRA essentially 
mandates the consideration of race in the redistricting process.95 
So, as the case law continues to develop, the Court continues to 
seek what some have referred to as a “Goldilocks” standard of 
taking race into account: not too much, not too little.96 The Court 
acknowledged in Alabama and in the Bethune-Hill oral argument 
                                                                                                     
 91. Compare Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986) (establishing 
a rule that led to the creation of misshapen districts in order to give minorities 
more voting power), with Shaw, 509 U.S. at 667 (considering the appearance of a 
district in determining its racial balance). 
 92. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 667–68 (finding that failing to consider racial 
considerations and aesthetic appearance of districts were not mutually exclusive). 
 93. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915–16 (1995) (narrowing the Shaw 
standard). 
 94. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1273–74 
(2015) (highlighting the “trap’s” existence and related problems). 
 95. See generally Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp.3d 
505 (E.D. Va. 2015). 
 96. In an interview with POLITICO, Rick Hasen, election law professor at 
University of California-Irvine and author of Election Law Blog, described 
Bethune-Hill as an opportunity for the Supreme Court to clarify the standard for 
racial gerrymandering cases: “It’s kind of a Goldilocks problem. You must take 
race into account somewhat to comply with the Voting Rights Act, but if you take 
into account too much the racial considerations you can get in trouble as well. The 
question is how do you know when you’ve gotten it just right.” See Josh Gerstein, 
Supreme Court Takes Case Claiming Racial Gerrymandering in Virginia, 
POLITICO (June 6, 2016), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-
radar/2016/06/virginia-redistricting-supreme-court-223946 (last visited Apr. 19, 
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice); see also Pamela Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court’s Voting 
Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 246 (1993) (referring to the “ongoing 
struggle between the Supreme Court and the political branches over how to 
address the enduring problems of race in America.”). 
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that compliance with the VRA is a compelling state interest.97 But, 
insofar as the Court’s case law has yet to become clearer than the 
“Goldilocks” standard, states remain threatened by what one 
attorney in the Bethune-Hill oral argument described as “junior-
varsity dilution claims.”98 
B. Escaping the Trap: Vote Dilution, Black Electoral Success and 
the Road not Taken 
States—indeed, the entire USA—could escape the trap that 
haunts current voting rights litigation by jettisoning the 
commitment to single-member districts in favor of multimember 
districts.99 Much has been written in favor of such a change for the 
United States.100 Advocates of political and electoral reform such 
as FairVote continue to lobby for a conversion to virtually any 
alternative to the single-member district system.101 Currently, 
FairVote advocates a conversion to ranked-choice voting where 
voters are able to select from a field of candidates and vote for them 
in order of preference.102  
There are numerous alternative forms of voting that would 
diminish, if not resolve the problems that lead states into the trap 
set by current election law. First, by converting five, single-
member districts into one, five-member district a state would 
diminish the need to litigate over the borders of four districts. 
Second, insofar as districts would be geographically larger and 
have larger populations, it would be less necessary for 
                                                                                                     
 97. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at 1273–74 (noting “that 
the interest in preventing § 5 retrogression” is a compelling state interest); 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 25–27, Bethune-Hill, 141 F. Supp. 3d.  
 98. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Bethune-Hill, 141 F. Supp. 3d. 
 99. See Douglas Amy, When Every Vote Counts: A Look at Proportional 
Voting, FAIRVOTE, (Apr. 1993), http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=646 (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2017) (arguing for multimember districts) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 100. Id.  
 101. See generally Advocacy, FAIRVOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/advocacy 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). 
 102. See generally Ranked Choice Voting/Instant Runoff, FAIRVOTE, 
http://www.fairvote.org/rcv#rcvbenefits (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
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cartographers to snake district lines across the state to pick up 
pockets of minority voters or Issacharoff’s “filler people” to meet 
the demands of the VRA. Third, with more candidates to choose 
from, voters would be much less likely to find themselves casting a 
vote in an election where an incumbent is either unchallenged or 
is challenged by a candidate who has no chance of winning. 
There is, of course, ample criticism of alternative electoral 
systems. They tend to increase the number of small parties who 
can contest elections. They produce correspondingly fragmented 
legislatures because the proliferation of small parties makes it 
more difficult for one party to win a majority of the seats. As a 
result, they tend to produce coalition governments that are not as 
stable as those produced by two party systems. So, there is a 
tradeoff between more legislative diversity and more voter choice 
and government stability.103 
Insofar as alternative electoral systems improve the quality of 
voter choice, one would think they would be part and parcel of VRA 
litigation. But, insofar as the Court said in Gingles that there is no 
right to proportional representation, there is no constitutional 
basis to seek to convert to an alternative form of voting.104 
Nonetheless, there is no question that an alternative electoral 
system as simple as a conversion to multimember districts would 
resolve much of the complexity in voting rights case law.105 Justice 
Thomas suggested as much in Holder v. Hall.106 
                                                                                                     
 103. See generally MARK E. RUSH & RICHARD L. ENGSTROM, FAIR AND 
EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION?  DEBATING ELECTORAL REFORM AND MINORITY RIGHTS 
(2001) (offering a comprehensive discussion of electoral reform); SAMUEL 
ISSACHAROFF, FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES: CONTESTED POWER IN THE ERA OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS (2005) (explaining how single-member districts, 
particularly in nascent democracies, avoids the proliferation of political parties 
and the potential problems of governability that it presents). 
 104. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 (1986) (noting that the Senate 
Report on the VRA provided that “the lack of proportional representation alone 
does not establish a violation” of § 2 of the VRA). 
 105. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 901 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In 
short, there are undoubtedly an infinite number of theories of effective suffrage, 
representation, and the proper apportionment of political power in a 
representative democracy that could be drawn upon to answer the questions 
posed in Allen.”). 
 106. See id. (articulating that a court must find a reasonable alternative 
practice to use as a benchmark to compare with the existing voting practice in a 
vote dilution case under § 2 of the VRA). 
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Holder entailed a suit by minority voters to challenge Bleckley 
County, Georgia’s decision not to convert from a single 
commissioner system of government to a five-district commission 
of government.107 The state legislature had authorized counties to 
convert to multimember systems.108 However, voters in a 
referendum rejected the conversion in Bleckley County.109 
Plaintiffs challenged the result of the referendum because 
maintaining the single commissioner system essentially prevented 
African American voters from gaining representation (since they 
comprised a minority of the voting-age population).110 Speaking for 
the Majority, Justice Kennedy said that there was no basis on 
which to challenge a decision not to change an electoral system. 
Even if there were a constitutional case, there was no standard for 
determining in Holder the size of the new government: “As the 
facts of this case well illustrate, the search for a benchmark is quite 
problematic when a § 2 dilution challenge is brought to the size of 
a government body. There is no principled reason why one size 
should be picked over another as the benchmark for 
comparison.”111 
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas challenged the Court to 
confront the doctrinal decisions and assumptions it had made as it 
had developed its VRA case law. The Court had established a 
preference for single-member voting districts without considering 
other choices of electoral systems. Thomas explained: 
Perhaps the most prominent feature of the philosophy that has 
emerged in vote dilution decisions…has been the Court’s 
preference for single member districting schemes, both as a 
benchmark for measuring undiluted minority voting strength 
and as a remedial mechanism for guaranteeing minorities 
                                                                                                     
 107. See id. at 877 (describing the basis for the claim). 
 108. See id. (explaining that the Georgia state legislature authorized Bleckley 
County to adopt a multimember commission in 1985 and noting that all but about 
ten counties in Georgia had converted to multimember districts). 
 109. See id. (stating that local voters rejected the adoption of a multimember 
commission in a 1986 referendum, despite having approved a multimember 
district plan for the county school board only four years earlier). 
 110. See id. at 878 (noting the respondents’ assertion that “Bleckley County 
must have a county commission of sufficient size that, with single-member 
election districts, the county’s black citizens would constitute a majority in one of 
the single-member districts.”). 
 111. Id. at 881. 
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undiluted voting power. Indeed, commentators surveying the 
history of voting rights litigation have concluded that it has 
been the objective of voting rights plaintiffs to use the Act to 
attack multimember districting schemes and to replace them 
with single member districting systems drawn with majority 
minority districts to ensure minority control of seats.  
It should be apparent, however, that there is no principle 
inherent in our constitutional system, or even in the history of 
the Nation’s electoral practices, that makes single member 
districts the “proper” mechanism for electing representatives to 
governmental bodies or for giving “undiluted” effect to the votes 
of a numerical minority. On the contrary, from the earliest days 
of the Republic, multimember districts were a common feature 
of our political systems . . . . Today, although they have come 
under increasing attack under the Voting Rights Act, 
multimember district systems continue to be a feature on the 
American political landscape, especially in municipal 
governments. 
The obvious advantage the Court has perceived in single 
member districts, of course, is their tendency to enhance the 
ability of any numerical minority in the electorate to gain 
control of seats in a representative body. But in choosing single 
member districting as a benchmark electoral plan on that basis 
the Court has made a political decision and, indeed, a decision 
that itself depends on a prior political choice … In other words, 
in an effort to develop standards for assessing claims of dilution, 
the Court has adopted the view that members of any 
numerically significant minority are denied a fully effective use 
of the franchise unless they are able to control seats in an 
elected body.112 
This decision to prefer single-member districts conditioned the 
Court’s reasoning going forward and, as we see above, led to the 
trap that the Court described in Alabama.113 
There is a more pernicious aspect of this decision that Lani 
Guinier pointed out in 1991.114 Anticipating Thomas’s criticism in 
Holder, Guinier argued that the Court and voting rights litigation 
                                                                                                     
 112. Id. at 897–99 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 113. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1273–74 
(2015) (highlighting the “trap’s” existence and related problems). 
 114. See Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 15, at 1081 
(explaining that “black electoral success theory evolved from the civil rights 
movement’s empowerment vision,” in response to “pressure for judicial 
supervision of the movement’s political agenda.”). 
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had developed a theory and vision of “black electoral success” that 
actually did not comport with the original vision of the VRA.115 
Guinier argued that while the focus on creating single-member 
majority-minority districts “may result in the election of more 
black officials, it ignores the movement's concern with broadening 
the base of participation and fundamentally reforming the 
substance of political decisions.”116 Thus, she contended, majority-
minority districts may ensure more representatives, but they “may 
not necessarily result in more responsive government.”117 If a 
polity were racially polarized the election of a few minority 
legislators would do little to advance the interests of their 
constituents.118  
Furthermore—and perhaps even more pernicious—Guinier 
suggested that the black electoral success theory’s focus on 
majority minority districts “ignores critical connections between 
broad-based, sustained voter participation and accountable 
representation.”119 That is, ensuring the success of minority 
elected officials will not necessarily enhance the fortunes of their 
constituents.120 
The impact of electoral success theory (for all legislators, not 
just minority representatives) is evident throughout the 
redistricting process. Incumbents and redistricters work together 
to move voters back and forth to create just the right balance to 
meet the mandates of the VRA and the desires of incumbents to 
make their districts more secure. In the oral argument for 
Bethune-Hill and the Court’s discussion in Alabama, judges and 
attorneys focused on the numbers of voters and their races shuttled 
in and out of districts. 
                                                                                                     
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1080.  
 117. Id. 
 118. See id. at 1116 (“Because the individual black elected official may not be 
able to overcome polarization to ‘infiltrate the decision making process’ at the 
legislative level, the election of black representatives does not, by itself, translate 
into intergroup cooperation.”). 
 119. Id. at 1080. 
 120. See id. at 1134 (explaining that one of black electoral success theory’s 
failings ensured that “legislative responsiveness would not be secured merely by 
the election day ratification of black representatives. Rather, legislative 
responsiveness would depend on citizen participation, legislative presence, and 
legislative success in meeting the needs of a disadvantaged group.”). 
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What is clear is that the goal of creating districts to ensure 
particular outcomes (the election of a minority legislator, the 
return of an incumbent) drives the redistricting process. What is 
not clear is whether or how the interests of constituents are 
regarded beyond their roles as filler people in legislative districts. 
As noted in the oral argument in Bethune-Hill: 
The lines weren’t there because, oh, we have this 55% BVAP 
target and everything had to go out the window. [Delegate 
Jones] said, well, you know, down there in Southampton Roads, 
we have three incumbents that are all close together because 
this part of the state lost a lot of population. So, I drew some 
zigs and zags here to keep the three incumbents separate . . . 121 
The role and impact of incumbency is, perhaps, the most 
important point raised in Bethune-Hill. As the following excerpt 
from the oral argument demonstrates, the Court addressed the fact 
that strong incumbents can change the voting profile of a district. 
In this case, it was acknowledged that an incumbent’s retirement 
could actually undermine the purpose of creating the majority-
minority district in the first place.122 In this exchange, Marc Elias 
(plaintiff’s attorney) veered from the discussion of the definition of 
“predominate” to consider the impact of incumbency on district 
voting patterns: 
JUSTICE ALITO: Wasn't there a primary in 2005 in that 
district where Representative Tyler won over a white candidate 
by less than 300 votes? 
MR. ELIAS: Yes, Your Honor. And I’m glad you raise that, 
because that’s the third one, and that is the most important one. 
Let us take a step back, because it’s–it’s interesting that he—
that he—he won by more–she won by more than—by—by only 
300 votes. The districts were drawn in two thousand–in—in 
two—following 2000. In 2001, there was an incumbent who had 
been there 30-some-odd years who was a candidate of choice of 
the African-American community who won. That candidate won 
again in a landslide in 2003.That candidate then retired, and it 
was then an open primary. And in that open primary, Delegate 
Tyler won by five percentage points. 
                                                                                                     
 121. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of 
Elections, 141 F.Supp.3d 505 (E.D. Va. 2015). 
 122. Id. at 22–24. 
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Now, what’s interesting is that 300 votes is five percentage 
points. This was a 6,000-vote primary. Five-way. So to say she 
won by 300 votes and that proves predominance, well, she won 
in a landslide. She won five—by five percentage points as a non-
incumbent in a multiple-primary field. 
JUSTICE KAGAN: I thought she won by only, like, 1 1/2 
percentage points in the general. 
MR. ELIAS: In the general. So what happened next is that the 
incumbent, who had retired, whose son had run against her in 
the primary, who she had beaten, he then endorses the 
Republican opponent. So you have this long-time incumbent 
who endorses the Republican opponent, and she wins by 1.3 
percent of the vote in the general. 
JUSTICE ALITO: But these—these districts are going to last 
for a decade, are they not? 
MR. ELIAS: Correct. 
JUSTICE ALITO: And—and there’s no guarantee that these 
same candidates are going to be running throughout that 
decade. 
MR. ELIAS: I agree. 
JUSTICE ALITO: So you think they have to take into account 
this very complicated analysis: Well, it was the—the person is 
an incumbent, and therefore is going to have the incumbent’s 
advantage, and -- 
MR. ELIAS: No, Your Honor, I’m saying the complete opposite. 
I’m saying that in 2001, 2003, 2007, 2009, this was—this 
performed without a close election. In 2005 the primary was not 
close; it was a five-point election. So that leaves us one election, 
which was the 2005 general where she won by 1.3 percent of the 
vote. 
JUSTICE KAGAN: Which you’re saying, essentially, is 
idiosyncratic. 
MR. ELIAS: It’s—it’s an idiosyncratic one election. But also, 
this Court has never said that it is a guarantee that they will 
win. It—in fact, in Gingles itself, there was a statement that it 
is not a guarantee—that no one election controls. 
JUSTICE ALITO: Well, I mean, that gets to an interesting 
point. What—to what—what degree of confidence that it will 
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remain a—a majority-minority district is necessary to have a 
strong basis in evidence?123 
This is a vitally important development.124 To the extent that the 
Court and attorneys acknowledge that a district’s voting profile is 
tied to the choices presented to voters on Election Day, it 
demonstrates that voter behavior is dependent on district-based 
conditions.125 In the context of majority-minority districts, Justice 
Alito’s comment in the exchange in Bethune uses an unfortunate 
choice of words.126 A district would still be majority-minority 
because of its racial composition.127 But, that majority might not 
coalesce around and elect one candidate even though the district is 
constructed to give minority voters the opportunity to do so.128 
Of course, electing minority representatives is vital to 
ensuring that a legislature hears the voices of a diversity of 
constituents.129 But, the manner in which those voices are heard 
does not necessarily depend on creating single-member districts 
that ensure the election of particular candidates.130 The exchange 
above demonstrates that voters will behave differently when 
presented with different choices.131 Accordingly, drawing majority-
minority districts that minimize voter choice clearly benefits 
incumbent legislators more than voters.132 An alternative, 
                                                                                                     
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. (shifting focus from predominance to the effect of incumbency on 
district voting). 
 125. See id. (recognizing that incumbency is an issue). 
 126. See id. (confusing how a district would be classified based on racial 
composition). 
 127. See Note, The Future of Majority-Minority Districts in Light of Declining 
Racially Polarized Voting, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2208, 2208 (2003) (discussing 
majority-minority districts and race). 
 128. See id. at 2209 (explaining that a minority could still win in a district 
where the majority is white). 
 129. See id. at 2211–12 (stating that, without diversity, minorities will not 
have an equal opportunity to be heard). 
 130. See id. at 2209–10 (stating that a coalitional district will allow minorities’ 
voices to be heard). 
 131. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 22–24, Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. 
of Elections, 141 F.Supp.3d 505 (E.D. Va. 2015) (delineating the different 
outcomes in different elections). 
 132. See Grant Hayden, Majority-Minority Voting Districts and Their Role in 
Politics: Their Advantages, Their Drawbacks, and the Current Law, FINDLAW 
(Oct. 7, 2004), http://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/majority-minority-
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multimember districting plan would give voters more choices, 
minimize gerrymandering driven by electoral success and perhaps 
get states out of the trap set by the current state of voting rights 
law.133 But, until the Court entertains a challenge to single-
member districts, the trap will remain in place and the theory of 
black electoral success will prevail.134 
III. Access to the Vote: Voter Identification Requirements in the 
Wake of Shelby v. Holder 
In what will certainly be regarded as one of the more 
unfortunate sequences of decisions, the Supreme Court upheld 
Indiana’s voter identification law in Crawford v. Marion County135 
and then struck down Section 4 of the VRA in Shelby County v. 
Holder.136 137 In so doing, the Court unleashed state legislatures to 
restrict access to polling stations on Election Day.138 In addition, 
by striking down Section 4 of the VRA (which set forth the criteria 
by which states or other political subdivisions were subject to the 
preclearance provisions of Section 5), the Court enabled states that 
had been subject to preclearance to erect hurdles to voter 
                                                                                                     
voting-districts-and-their-role-in-politics.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) 
(illustrating that drawing a majority-minority district involves pulling minority 
voters from other districts, which dilutes minority voting power) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).  
 133. See ACE ELECTORAL KNOWLEDGE NETWORK, THE ACE ENCYCLOPEDIA: 
BOUNDARY DELIMITATION 22–23 (2013), http://aceproject.org/ace-
en/pdf/bd/at_download/file (detailing the advantages of multimember districts). 
 134. See id. (stating that single-member districts have the disadvantage of 
unequal representation). 
 135. 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
 136. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 137. See Tomas Lopez, ‘Shelby County’: One Year Later, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUST. (June 24, 2014), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/shelby-county-one-
year-later (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (discussing effects of the Shelby holding) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); see 
also Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 
28, 2008), https://www.brennancenter.org/legal-work/crawford-v-marion-county-
election-board (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (outlining harms of upholding Indiana’s 
voter ID law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice).  
 138. See Lopez, supra note 137 (stating how these laws may restrict access to 
voting). 
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registration and voting that would have required review by the 
federal government.139 
Indiana law required voters to present a valid photo ID at 
polling places in order to vote.140 If voters objected to being 
photographed or were unable to present an ID at the polls (even if 
they possessed one), they could cast provisional ballots.141 The 
Indiana Democratic Party challenged the law as an infringement 
on the right to vote in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.142 
Indiana argued that the ID requirement was grounded in a 
compelling interest to prevent voter fraud and maintain voter 
confidence in the electoral process.143 In sustaining the 
constitutionality of the ID requirement, the Court stated: 
There is no question about the legitimacy or importance of the 
State’s interest in counting only the votes of eligible voters. 
Moreover, the interest in orderly administration and accurate 
recordkeeping provides a sufficient justification for carefully 
identifying all voters participating in the election process. While 
the most effective method of preventing election fraud may well 
be debatable, the propriety of doing so is perfectly clear.144 
The Court distinguished the voter ID requirement from other 
practices that it had struck down or supported.145 On the one hand, 
the Court had struck down the poll tax in Harper v. Virginia Board 
of Elections146 as an unconstitutionally discriminatory barrier to 
voting.147 On the other, it had upheld restrictions on write-in 
                                                                                                     
 139. See Jamie Fuller, How Has Voting Changed Since Shelby County v. 
Holder?, WASH. POST (July 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2014/07/07/how-has-voting-changed-since-shelby-county-v-
holder/?utm_term=.c53c1f305cb9 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (giving examples of 
how the loss of Section 4 has created issues in different states) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 140. See generally Pub. L. 109-2005, 2005 Indiana Acts 2005; see also 
Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 185–86 (2008) (describing the 
key provisions of Indiana’s voter identification law). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 186–87. 
 143. Id. at 191–93. 
 144. Id. at 196. 
 145. See, e.g., id. at 198 (distinguishing Indiana’s voter ID law from the poll 
tax struck down in Harper v. Virginia because Indiana did not require voters to 
pay a tax or fee to acquire a new photo ID, but provided them for free). 
 146. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 147. Id. at 670. 
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ballots (Burdick v. Takushi148) and other “evenhanded restrictions 
that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process 
itself" as not invidious.149 
The Court acknowledged that the voter ID requirement 
“imposes some burdens on voters that other methods of 
identification do not share.”150 Specifically, the Court noted,  
a somewhat heavier burden may be placed on a limited number 
of persons. They include elderly persons born out-of-state, who 
may have difficulty obtaining a birth certificate; persons who 
because of economic or other personal limitations may find it 
difficult either to secure a copy of their birth certificate or to 
assemble the other required documentation to obtain a state-
issued identification; homeless persons; and persons with a 
religious objection to being photographed.151 
But, the Court said, the severity of this burden was mitigated by 
the fact that voters without ID could cast a provisional ballot.152 
Since the evidence presented by the petitioners did not 
demonstrate that the voter ID provision had an impact on any 
discrete class of voters, the Court saw no reason to strike the law 
down.153 
The petitioners also insisted that the law was clearly designed 
to harm Democratic voters because the law had been passed 
unanimously by the Republican majorities in the state legislature 
and opposed with equal unanimity by the Democratic 
minorities.154 But, the Court said, “if a nondiscriminatory law is 
supported by valid neutral justifications, those justifications 
should not be disregarded simply because partisan interests may 
have provided one motivation for the votes of individual 
legislators.”155 
                                                                                                     
 148. 504 U.S. 28 (1992). 
 149. Crawford v. Marion Cty, Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008). 
 150. Id. at 197. 
 151. Id. at 199. 
 152. Id. at 195. 
 153. See id. at 202–04 (stating that the law is amply justified by voter 
interest). 
 154. See id. at 188 (describing how a law that made it more difficult for 
minorities to vote could adversely affect the Democratic party). 
 155. Id. at 204. 
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Crawford upheld district and appeals court decisions that had 
reached the same conclusion.156 Justice Richard Posner, who wrote 
the appeals court decision, subsequently expressed regrets about 
doing so.157 In his book, Reflections on Judging, Posner stated: “I 
plead guilty to having written the majority opinion (affirmed by 
the Supreme Court) upholding Indiana’s requirement that 
prospective voters prove their identity with a photo ID—a type of 
law now widely regarded as a means of voter suppression rather 
than fraud prevention.”158 
Writing in The New Republic in 2013, Posner insisted that this 
was not a recantation of his opinion.159 Instead, he maintained, it 
was an acknowledgment that he—like any other judge—may be 
insufficiently knowledgeable about the technical aspects of a 
subject to which the law applies that a legal decision made in the 
abstract confines of a courtroom might fail to take into account the 
decision’s consequences.160 Accordingly, Posner said essentially 
that he made the wrong decision for the right reasons: “We judges 
weren’t given, in Crawford, the data we would have needed to 
balance the good and bad effects of the Indiana law.”161 Insofar as 
the evidence against the law was, at the time, “totally unreliable,” 
Posner asserted that there were no grounds on which to strike it 
down.162 To have done so, he argued “would have plunged the 
federal courts deeply into the management of the electoral 
process.”163 
Posner cited Richard Trotter’s “Vote of Confidence: Crawford 
v. Marion County Election Board, Voter Identification Laws and 
the Suppression of a Structural Right”164 to demonstrate the 
                                                                                                     
 156. Id. at 188–89. 
 157. See generally RICHARD POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 84–85 (2013). 
 158. Id.  
 159. See Richard Posner, I Did Not ‘Recant’ on Voter ID Laws, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Oct. 27, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/115363/richard-posner-i-did-not-
recant-my-opinion-voter-id (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (explaining that the 
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(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).  
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See generally Richard Trotter, Vote of Confidence: Crawford v. Marion 
County Election Board, Voter Identification Laws, and the Suppression of a 
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dilemmas judges find themselves in when dealing with highly 
technical or discrete applications of the law.165 According to 
Trotter, Crawford is ripe to be overturned because “[t]he 
evidentiary gaps that proved decisive in Crawford were a product 
of the relative novelty of voter identification laws and the lack of 
mainstream scholarly and journalistic attention dedicated to its 
potential effects.”166 Between the Crawford decision and 2012, 
when Trotter was writing, 34 states had introduced voter ID laws 
and 7 had signed them into law.167 
Fortunately, the wave of legislation attempting to restrict 
access to voting seems to be receding.168 In several recent cases, 
lower courts have struck down restrictive voter registration and 
identification requirements in North Carolina, Texas and 
Wisconsin.169 In North Carolina, the United States Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals overturned a district court ruling that had 
sustained the constitutionality of several voter registration 
restrictions passed under the auspices of a fifty-seven-page 
omnibus bill.170 After spending about fifty-five pages documenting 
actions by the state legislature that were clearly designed to 
restrict access to the polls in manners that disproportionately 
discriminated against African Americans, the court stated: 
The totality of the circumstances—North Carolina’s history of 
voting discrimination; the surge in African American voting; the 
legislature’s knowledge that African Americans voting 
translated into support for one party; and the swift elimination 
of the tools African Americans had used to vote and imposition 
of a new barrier at the first opportunity to do so—cumulatively 
and unmistakably reveal that the [Republican majority in the] 
                                                                                                     
Structural Right, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 515 (2013). 
 165. See Posner, supra note 159 159(recalling the dearth of research available 
on voter identification when Crawford was decided). 
 166. Trotter, supra note 164, at 538. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 243–44 
(4th Cir. 2016) (striking down restrictive voter registration and identification 
laws). 
 169. See generally id.; Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. Tex. 2016); 
Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Wis. 2014).  
 170. See McCrory, 831 F.3d at 216 (explaining that, after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Shelby County essentially lifted the preclearance regime, the North 
Carolina legislature “swiftly expanded an essentially single-issue bill into 
omnibus legislation.”). 
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General Assembly used SL 2013-381 to entrench itself. It did so 
by targeting voters who, based on race, were unlikely to vote for 
the majority party.171 
The court distinguished its reasoning from that employed by the 
Supreme Court in Crawford.172 In McCrory, there was no reason to 
defer to legislative considerations about voter fraud.173 
That deference does not apply here because the evidence in this 
case establishes that, at least in part, race motivated the North 
Carolina legislature. Thus, we do not ask whether the State has 
an interest in preventing voter fraud—it does—or whether a 
photo ID requirement constitutes one way to serve that 
interest—it may—but whether the legislature would have 
enacted SL 2013-381’s photo ID requirement if it had no 
disproportionate impact on African American voters. The record 
establishes that it would not have.174 
One would hope that legislators are no longer motivated by 
racially discriminatory intentions.175 But, the North Carolina story 
demonstrates that this is a quixotic hope at least for the time 
being.176 McCrory therefore highlights the impact of the Supreme 
Court’s decision to declare Section 4(b) of the VRA unconstitutional 
in Shelby.177 The Court struck down Section 4(b), which provided 
the coverage formula used to identify the jurisdictions covered by 
Section 5’s preclearance regime, because the Court found that the 
criteria used were terribly outdated: 
Coverage today is based on decades-old data and eradicated 
practices. The formula captures States by reference to literacy 
                                                                                                     
 171. Id. at 233. 
 172. See id. at 235 (noting that, in Crawford, the Supreme Court gave 
deference to the Indiana legislature’s decision to implement a voter ID law as the 
best way to serve its legitimate interest in combatting voter fraud and promoting 
public confidence in the state’s electoral system). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. HANS VON SPAKOVSKY, ELIZABETH SLATTERY & ROGER CLEGG, WHAT 
CONGRESS CAN DO TO STOP RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 7, 
2014), http://www.heritage.org/civil-rights/report/what-congress-can-do-stop-
racial-discrimination.  
 176. See id. (showing how a legislator recently was motivated by racial 
discrimination). 
 177. See id. (demonstrating how a legislator was able to make a law that was 
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tests and low voter registration and turnout in the 1960s and 
early 1970s. But such tests have been banned nationwide for 
over 40 years. And voter registration and turnout numbers in 
the covered States have risen dramatically in the years since. 
Racial disparity in those numbers was compelling evidence 
justifying the preclearance remedy and the coverage formula. 
There is no longer such a disparity. 
In 1965, the States could be divided into two groups: those with 
a recent history of voting tests and low voter registration and 
turnout, and those without those characteristics. Congress 
based its coverage formula on that distinction. Today the Nation 
is no longer divided along those lines, yet the Voting Rights Act 
continues to treat it as if it were. (internal citations omitted).178 
While the Shelby decision made sense in theory, it provides 
another Posnerian example of judges being insufficiently aware of 
the consequences of their decisions.179 Absent the Shelby decision, 
North Carolina’s legislature would have been required by Section 
5 of the VRA to submit such widespread voting legislation to the 
Department of Justice for preclearance, where it is likely the DOJ 
would have raised objections to the same voting restrictions later 
struck down by the Fourth Circuit.180 In McCrory, the Fourth 
Circuit extensively documented how the Shelby decision 
precipitated the expansion and passage of “the most restrictive 
voting legislation seen in North Carolina since the passage of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965.”181 While the Supreme Court would 
hope that the VRA has achieved its goals, the events in North 
Carolina demonstrate that this is not the case.182 
If any good news is emanating from the area of voting rights 
despite the impact of Shelby, it is the fact that the forces of 
enhancing voter access seem to be advancing. According to the 
Brennan Center, in the first three months of 2016, 
“422 bills to enhance voting access were introduced or carried over 
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 179. Compare Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 15 with Shelby 
Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2620 (2013). 
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 182. Compare id. with Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 2633 (stating the VRA’s goals).  
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in 41 states plus the District of Columbia. Meanwhile, at 
least 77 bills to restrict access to registration and voting have been 
introduced or carried over from the prior session in 28 states.”183 
Legislation to promote or establish automatic voter registration 
was advancing in twenty-eight states and the District of 
Columbia.184 Unfortunately, twenty states have enacted new 
restrictions on voting since 2010.185 Without the potent weapon of 
preclearance, which deterred states from enacting broad voting 
restrictions, the federal government cannot take action against 
discriminatory state election laws until they have gone into effect 
and, even at that point, a plaintiff seeking to challenge a voting 
restriction must be able to prove that the law was motivated by 
discriminatory intent or has had a clear discriminatory impact.186 
IV. The Electoral College 
The Electoral College came under fire in 2016 because Donald 
Trump was elected with a majority of the Electoral College vote 
despite receiving more than 2 million fewer votes than Hillary 
Clinton.187 This precipitated renewed calls for reform and a change 
to some form of a national popular vote mechanism to elect the 
president.188 
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The Electoral College reminds us that there can be many 
forms of democracy and elections.189 Not all are simple, 
majoritarian systems.190 In the United States, the reasoning for 
the Electoral College (and the governmental structure on which it 
is based) is grounded in the reasoning that informed the 
establishment of the Constitution.191 
In Federalist 10, James Madison set forth a vision of politics 
that was intended to constrain the will of the majority.192 The large 
republic that the country would be in the late 18th century would 
proliferate interest groups (Madison’s “factions”) and therefore 
make it extraordinarily difficult for a majority to form.193 If one did 
form around a particular issue, Madison expected that it would 
quickly dissolve because other issues would divide it.194  
The separation of powers among the three branches of the 
federal government and the division of powers between the states 
and the federal government were also designed to make governing 
difficult.195 Specifically, the bicameral Congress was designed to 
give states equal representation in the Senate regardless of their 
size.196 
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There is no question that this constitutional structure, 
however democratic, does not treat voters equally in all 
circumstances; instead, it tends to under-represent the voting 
power of large states while over-representing the voting power of 
smaller ones197 For instance, Wyoming has the same number of 
senators to represent its 586,107 residents that California has to 
represent 39,144,818 residents.198 The same type of disparity can 
be seen in the electoral college system for United States 
presidential elections, where each state is apportioned the number 
of electors equal to the size of its Congressional delegation.199 
Wyoming receives one electoral vote for every 195,369 residents, 
while Californian receives one electoral vote for every 678,945 
residents.200 
Were a presidential election result to produce no Electoral 
College winner, the Constitution dictates that the top three 
candidates (in terms of Electoral Votes) would then contest the 
election in the House of Representatives.201 Were this to occur, 
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each state delegation to the House would cast one vote.202 
Accordingly, lone representatives of states like Wyoming, the 
Dakotas and Delaware would cast their votes while California’s 55 
representatives would have to caucus and vote to decide which 
candidate would receive their one, lone vote.203 
The House itself is hardly a bastion of equality.204 Montana, 
with 994,416 residents has one representative.205 Meanwhile, 
Rhode Island with 1,055,247 residents sends two representatives 
to the House.206 
                                                                                                     
those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose 
immediately, by ballot, the President.”). 
 202. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (“But in choosing the President, the votes 
shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote.”). 
 203. See Electoral College Information, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/electoral-college/ (detailing how the state of 
California’s 55 representatives elect the President) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 204. See infra notes 205–06 (showing that although both Montana and Rhode 
Island have comparable population size, their allotted number of Representatives 
in the House differ). 
 205. See Montana, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/members/ 
MT (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (stating that there is one United States House 
Representative in Montana) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). 
 206. See Rhode Island, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
members/RI (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (stating that there are two United States 
House Representatives in Rhode Island) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
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In isolation, the United States would appear to be a terribly 
undemocratic, gerrymandered legislative and electoral system 
that favors Republican and rural voters.207 But, if we broaden our 
scope of inquiry, we see that the deviations from pure, democratic 
equality are common in many federal nations.  
Canada suffers similar disparities of representation in the 
House of Commons.208 Ontario, with 13,983,000 residents, has 121 
seats in the Commons for a ratio of 115,562 residents per seat.209 
Meanwhile, Nunavut’s 37,100 residents have one member in the 
                                                                                                     
 207. See Dylan Matthews, The Senate Is Undemocratic and It Matters, VOX 
(Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.vox.com/2015/1/6/7500935/trende-senate-vote-share 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (suggesting that because small states do not have a lot 
of heavily populated cities, when they ‘district by state,’ they effectively district 
in a way that favors rural, conservative-leaning areas) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 208. See LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT, GUIDE TO THE CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS 
3–4 (2016), http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/GuideToHoC/pdf/guide_ 
canadian_house_of_commons-e.pdf (describing Canada’s bicameral legislative 
structure, comprised of the Senate and House of Commons, which are generally 
analogous to the United States Senate and House). 
 209. See id. (noting the allocation of seats in the House of Commons per 
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House of Commons and roughly three times the voting power of 
the average Ontarian.210  
 
 
Finally, the European Parliament manifests similar 
representational disparities.211 Tiny Malta, with a population of 
429,344 has six seats in the parliament for a ratio of 71,557 
residents per seat.212 On the other hand, 81,197,537 Germans have 
ninety-six seats in the Parliament.213 With a ratio of 845,808 
                                                                                                     
 210. See id. (indicating that Nunavut is allocated only one seat in the 
Commons). 
 211. See MEPs, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
meps/en/map.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (explaining that the European 
Parliament is comprised of 751 Members elected by the 28 Member-States of the 
European Union and that seats are allocated based on Member-State population) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 212. See Living in the EU, EUROPEAN UNION, https://europa.eu/european-
union/about-eu/figures/living_en#tab-1–3 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (indicating 
that Malta’s population is 429,344) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights and Social Justice); MEPs by Member State and Political Group: 
8th Parliamentary Term, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl.europa. 
eu/meps/en/crosstable.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (indicating that Malta is 
allocated six seats in the European Parliament). 
 213. See Living in the EU, supra note 212 (indicating that Germany’s 
population is 81,197,537); MEPs by Member State and Political Group, supra note 
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residents per seat, Germans have less than one-eleventh of the 
voting power of the Maltese.214 
Such population disparities exist in systems that are designed 
to ensure meaningful representation of constituent interests 
(states, provinces or countries) in addition to individual voter 
equality. In all three legislatures, the smaller constituencies have 
far greater voting power than the larger ones.215 Ironically, this 
sort of representation manifests the values that Lani Guinier 
advocated in “The Triumph of Tokenism.”216 There, she called for 
“proportionate interest representation,” a scheme of 
representation that, essentially, over-represents minorities in 
order to give them a more effective presence in legislatures.217  
Guinier wrote with regard to the plight of racial minorities in 
electorates that are polarized along racial lines.218 In rejecting the 
black electoral success theory’s reliance on or satisfaction with 
merely electing a number of minority legislators (roughly) 
proportional to the minority percentage of the population, Guinier 
called for the adjustment of voting rules in the legislature to 
enhance the influence of minority representatives: 
Where majority representatives refuse to bargain with 
representatives of the minority, simple majority vote rules 
would be replaced. “A minority veto” for legislation of vital 
importance to minority interests would respond to evidence of 
gross “deliberative gerrymanders.” Alternatively, depending on 
the proof of disproportionate majority power, plaintiffs might 
seek minority assent through other supermajority 
                                                                                                     
 214. Id. 
 215. See supra notes 203197–07 (United States), 208208–10 (Canada), 
211211–13 (European Union) and accompanying text. 
 216. See generally Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 15. 
 217. See id. at 1136 (“Proportionate interest representation disavows the 
pluralist conception of fairness, which falsely assumes equal bargaining power 
simply based on access, or numerically proportionate electoral success for all 
groups.”). 
 218. See id. at 1125 (“Given residential segregation, the assumption supports 
district election structures to reconfigure a heterogeneous, polarized electorate 
into a homogeneous one. The assumption correctly perceives that district 
elections favor black electoral success “because black candidates seeking district 
seats can steer clear of direct competition with white candidates.”). 
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arrangements, concurrent legislative majorities, consociational 
arrangements, or rotation in office.219  
To the extent that the Electoral College constrains majorities and 
over-represents the power and influence of small states, it 
embraces at least some of Guinier’s approach to representative 
fairness.220 It compels majorities in the House of Representatives 
and the Senate to work with minorities (small states), it provides 
incentives for presidential candidates to campaign in small states 
and, occasionally, elects a president with a majority of the 
Electoral College but not the popular vote.221 
V. Conclusion 
My review of these three aspects of contemporary election law 
is not meant to suggest that other aspects are not important. But, 
these three issues embody talismanic concerns about democratic 
integrity. VRA litigation has only enhanced and normalized brazen 
gerrymandering practices that serve the interests of legislators, 
but not necessarily the voters who elect them. The Supreme 
Court’s decision to strike down section 4 of the VRA (and thereby 
render Section 5 meaningless) unleashed a wave of legislative 
attempts to restrict access to the polls that were clearly designed 
to discriminate on the basis of race and partisanship. While the 
Electoral College has come under fire due to the way it functioned 
in the 2016 presidential election, it is ironic to realize that its 
promotion of the power of smaller states manifests the same vision 
of minority representation rights that informs Lani Guinier’s 
criticism of American voting rights litigation. 
Democratic theory is complex and rife with competing values 
that do not necessarily complement one another.222 The Electoral 
                                                                                                     
 219. Id. at 1140. 
 220. See id. at 1090 (“For the integrationist, litigation to achieve black 
electoral success incorporated the preeminent process theory of empowerment: 
measuring political equality by the fairness of the process through which 
representatives were elected.”). 
 221. See, e.g., Gregory Krieg, supra note 187 (stating that, in the 2016 United 
States presidential election, Hillary Clinton, the Democratic candidate, won 
almost 2.9 million more votes than Donald Trump, the Republican candidate, but 
lost the electoral college, 232 to 306, thereby losing the presidential election). 
 222. See Norman Daniels, Democratic Equality: Rawl’s Complex 
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College manifests that complexity. The current state of 
redistricting law demonstrates how legislation such as the Voting 
Rights Act can be hijacked at the expense of voters. The attempts 
to restrict access to the polls in the wake of Shelby remind us of 
James Madison’s observation about human nature:  
But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections 
on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be 
necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor 
internal constraints on government would be necessary.223 
Despite the existence of the internal constraints on government 
that Madison and the Framers designed, the current state of 
election law demonstrates that angels do not govern the rules of 
the American electoral process.  
                                                                                                     
Egalitarianism, HARVARD T.H. CHAN SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, 
https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/benchmark/ndaniels/pdf/democratic_equality.pdf 
(writing that democratic theory is complex because it is “motivated by several 
distinct egalitarian ideas” and rests on “three principles of justice that interact 
with and limit each other.”). 
 223. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).  
